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Defendant* and Respondents* ^uK^. >' J^/D VI 
MAPOHAN, Justice: (IHsseffitog) 
Plaintiff, Chairman of the Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning 
Gomrnlsaioa, was indicted by a Grand Jury on two .counts of soliciting 
m br ibe and two counta of accepting a bribe; all a r t felonies* Plaintiff 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging the illegality of 
his'constructive restraint* The tr ial court dismissed the action on the 
ground the complaint failed to state a ctainn upon which relief could he 
granted* Plaintiff appeals*, We should *eversp,iti part* 
Prior to filing the complaint, plaintiff filed four motions 
seeking* I) Verbatim copies of transcripts of testimony of all wit* 
messes who appeared before the grand jury relative to the indietmettt, t) 
The .-Hansen, addressee, and telephone numbers of all persons interviewed 
by the grand Jury to determine both Inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, 
3) Depositions of all persons deemed neceasary for adequate preparation 
of his defense to the indictment, and 4) A preliminary examination before 
t r ial on the indictment* 
The t r ia l court denied na t ions 3} and 4); motion Z) was granted 
oiily insofar as to the®e witnesses whom the state would call at the trial* 
In regard to motion 1), plaintiff was denied verbatim copies of testimony 
of any witnesses who appeared before the grand jury relative to the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. ; • : . ' / • • • , - 2 - ; • . . • • : 
indictmentg test* 1M w i a permttted to read ilie traaeeript of HMiiimonf 
of the three wi tnesses whose names were endorsed on the indictment. 
Its was denied the Tight to-'**&*- ^ r t a t t a a n e t e * t^neerninji tite testimony 
of these three witaa©#»##* / 
Thereafter* plaintiff filed the instant petition on the ground the 
trial court had no jurisdiction to proceed; iwfrcanse there was -90 p M I « 
can** for the indictment, and his restraint was im violation of due process 
and e ipa l protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions* 
W i should rule that pl^iatiff could
 mim the i s sues im a habeas 
corpus proceeding; he i s entitled ton preliminary hearing; he should be 
able to take depositions, except for members of the grand jury* Thm 
trial court did not err in limiting the names and addresses of witnesses 
to be revealed to plaintiff. Plaintiff should be permitted to make a ver -
batim copy only of the testimony of the witnesses whose names were 
endorsed upon the indictment as witnesses* 
Did plaintiff state a cause of melton opoa which relief may be 
granted? t think so* The state vigorously orges plaintiff is not entitled 
toa writ of Habeas cor punt because he is not restrained of his l iberty** 
he i s free on his own recognizance* 
Rule 6SB(a)« URCP# provides, 
* * * Where no plain, speedy end adequate remedy e x i s t s , relief 
may he obtained by appropriate action under- these rules , on 
any one of the f rounds set forth in subdivisions (b) and (f) of 
the rule. 
Plaintiff has proceeded under Rule 65B{£)t tIRCP* 
Appropriate relief by habeas corpus proceedings shall 
be granted whenever it appears to the proper court that any 
nerson is unkifltlv imprisoned or otherwise restrained of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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~ 
In the case of tm re Smiley1 iba l*mm before the mmt waa whether 
the remedy of habeas corpus was available to ome who wa# at liberty tm 
his mm recogaisance* The cotart observed that the nee of habeas coirgKia had 
not been restricted to siioatioaa in which the applicant was in Actual 
physical custody, but had beett involved ta relieve a wide varl«ty of *HwMr 
restraints on a mat*** iibariy. Both ball and a releate om one1* ^wa 
recognizance are davices to assure one will attest court when his g*re~ 
eence is required, and there are meaningful sanctions to assure such 
agreement is fulfilled. The court held inch aa individual is not free 
to go where he will, for he to subject to restraints not shared by the 
public generally; ami, therefore, he is aader sufficient constructive 
2 
custody to permit him to invoke the writ* 
In this jurisdiction* the writ of habeas corpus is used to protect 
one who is restrained of his liberty where there exists no jurisdiction 
or authority* or where the requirement* of the law have been ao ignored 
or distorted the party is substantially and effectively denied what la 
included in the term due process of law. Also* where some othar cir-
cumstance exists that it would be wholly unconscionable not to re* 
examine the conviction* 3 There Is also authority* in this jurisdiction, 
that mm accused who, in fact* is denied a preliminary examination and 
did act waive this right la entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, * 
Plaintiff states the trial court erred in dismissing his claim* 
1. 66 Cal. 2d 696* 58 Cat. Eptr* 57^* 427 P*2d 179 0967)* 
2* Also see Franklin v» State* Nev*, Si 3 P*2d 1252 (1973); Jacobsoat 
v. State* Nov** 510 P.2d 856 (If73); Henaley v* Municipal Conrt* San 
Jose Mllpitas Judicial district* 411 0*S. 345* 36 L*Ed. 2d 294* 93 S. CU 
157! (1973). 
3. Brvaat v. Turner. If 0tah 2d 284* 431 P. 2d 121 (1967 ft Gal legos 
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because t b t f 0 w a f a genuine Isane a* to whether there was probable 
cause to return the indictment* He argues a court lack* jurisdiction 
to proceed to a criminal trial, until probable cause has bee a determined 
to **i#t« Ift addltlon>that stich c i w r t be ascertained without reviewing 
tlw testimony of those witnesses whose names wer# endorsed on this 
indictment. 
There are two basic issuer he*a« la an indictee entitled to a 
determination of whether there ia probable cause to support the Indict-
meat, If so , by what procedure Is. tbls standard ascertained* 
Since I f 12, Nevada bas utilised habeas corpus to determine 
the l ega l sufficiency of evidence supporting a grand Jury indictment* 
The rationale here is the unfairness of requiring one to stand trial 
unless probable cause exists to justify anch a irar-qa^azxiaM*' "The 
court permits an inquiry a s io whetiter amy snbat^ttiHat evidence exists 
which, II tri**# would aitfpsort a verdict of conviction; for If there be 
noma* the grand jury baa exceeded ita powers* and the indictment i s 
5 4 
wld« In Shelby v* .Sixth Judicial .District Courts the court cited 
stati§i*iry proviaioaa substantially similar to Section 77-19*3 and 7?~I9~5# 
11. Cm A.
 $ 19S3*. and stated that claimant was entitled to a pretrial 
inspection of the testimony of the witnesses who appeared before the 
grand jury * The court out then Intelligently determine whether the 
hind and quality of evidence contemplated by the coil* was In fact 
{MPod^ced heiore. the grand jnryj and whether the Indicted defendant 
should be held fort****** 
S* Shelby v* 'Sixth Judicial. District Comtt$ 02 Hev* £04, 214 P*2d 
942 (1966); mpon reheartai , 82 Nev, 213# 418 P,2d 132 (l%&% 
I L Mwhfc:<<<4L. «*§*%*»& . •»•* jt*rv.. n a a ~ a a a **# ^ f ^ is **t 
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Section 77-19-3* U. C* A* H53* as amended 19&7* provide*: 
la the investigation of a chaige for the purpose of indie*-
mmmk the grand jury must receive no other evidence than such 
as shall be given by witnesses produced and sworn before 
them orfurnished by legal documentary evidence o r deposition 
of a witness as provided in Section 77-1-8 • • » The grand 
Jtsry m^at receive none bat legal evidence* &®& the beet 
evidence in degree* to the exclusion of hearsay or secondary 
evidence. 
Section 77-19-5, U* CU A. 1953* provides* 
The grand jnry ought to find an indictment when all the 
evidence before them, taken together, if unexplained o r 
uncontradicted, wo^ald in their judgment warrant a con-
viction by a t r ial jury* 
In light of the foregoing statutes, there shonld be a legal procedure 
to determine whether the kind and quality of evidence r e h i r e d was pro* 
duced before the grand jury* and whether there was probable canse to 
hold the accused to stand trial* Plaintiff nrges that he be granted a 
preliminary examination as provided in Chapter 15, Title 77, This 
procedure would give defendant an opportunity to be present and to 
produce and examine witnesses* Section 77-15-11* for the grand jnry 
is not bonnd to hear evidence for the defendant* Section 77*19~4«» 
Article I, Section 13* Constitution of Utah* provides! 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by Indict* 
menf, shall be prosecuted by information after examination* 
unless the examination be waived by the aeen#®d with the 
consent of the State* or by indictment* with or wlthont snch 
examination and commitment* The formation of the grand 
jnry and the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed 
by the Legislature* 
Section 77*1-4* 0 # C* A. 1953* provides: 
Every public offense mnst be prosecuted by information 
after examination and commitment by a magistrate unless 
the examination is waived by the accused with the consent 
of the state, or by indictment, with or witbont snch exami-
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When the defendant ia brought before tbtt-«ittkgi«trtt-Hi opom 
an mrvrnnt* either with or without a war ram, on a charge 
of having committed a public offense triable on information 
or indictment, the magistrate fn^uit immediately inform him 
of ill* charge against him and of hia right to the aid of counsel 
in everye tage of the proeeediaga* 
Sect ion 77 -1^3 , prov ides* 
At the time set for the hearing themagis t ra te before 
whom the accused is brought moat • » v proceed to examine 
the case* 
Section 77~lS-!7, providest 
If after hear log the proof a it appears that either no 
public offense has been committed, or that there is not 
sufficient cause to believe the defendant gnilty of a public 
offense, the magistrate must order the defendant to be 
discharged, by an indorsement am the warrant or the com* 
plaint signed by him* to the following effect! *There being 
no sufficient earn** to believe the within named A B guilty 
of the offense within mentioned, I order him discharged. ' 
Section 77-16-2* provides? 
Mo defect or irregularity in or want ©r absence of any 
proceeding or statutory reqnlremeot, prior to the filing of -
an infarinattoii or indictment, including the preliminary 
*•**»«!* •*»** constitute prejudicial e r ro r and the defendant . 
shall be conclusively presumed to have waited any stich 
defect* irregularity, want or absence of proceeding or 
statutory requirement, unless he shall before pleading to 
••.v. the iMormatlon or indictment specifically and expressly 
object to the information or indictment on such ground. 
A review of the constitutional and statutory provisions reveals 
there la no eapres* prohibition, denying one indicted a preliminary 
examination. By Section 77-16-2, he is conclusively presumed to have 
waived any objection to an indictment which was based on evidence not 
commensurate with the statutory reqsiiremeata of Section 77-I f*3 , 
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The apparent n^atting of the provialone allowing prosecution to 
proceed by ImdietmsBt with or wlthont examination la the one Indicted 
baa the option to request such an examination. It is distinguishable 
from the right accorded an accused proeeciited by Informatloii* because 
In the latter situation an examination must be belli *»leaa a waiver la 
established. Where prosectition la begun by indictment, the arcnaed 
mtiat take affirmative action t& be accorded thia right* 
Plaintiff eiated a claim upon which relief conld be granted, vls» 
a denial of a preliminary examination7 ~~ be wae entitled to tMe pro** 
cediire# .• 
Plaintiff further contends he la entitled to a verbatim tranacrlpt 
of all grand jury witneeaea* Thia demand la not In accord with Section 
7?~%y~% U# C* A«> 1953, aa amended I9?t# the relevant portlona elates 
* * » It ehait he the duty of auch stenographic reporter to 
report In shorthand the teatimony that may be given before 
the grand jury and, where an Indictment la returned, to 
transcribe the jhiaHtm&y of the defendant o r defendants y 
and all witnesses whose aamee a re inserted or endorsed V,,V ^ 
upon the indictment aa witnesses
 # * • 
To limit the disclosure of the teatimony of the wltneeaea before 
the grand jury, to those whose names a re endoraed on the indictment la 
in consonance with the aforecited statute, Snch alee atrlkea a proper 
?."11 wtnnovtch v* F-mery# Note 4# supra, 
3» Plaintiff haa cited the concurring opinion of Justice Moak In Johnaon 
v* Superior Conrt of San Joaqnin, 15 CaL 3d 24S# 124 Cah Rptr* 32* 539 
P*2d 792 (I9T5)# wherein It la clearly pointed out that the intrinsic con-
etltntlonal infirmity In the grand jnry*a Indicting function can be cared only 
by allowing every indicted defendant a poat~ indictment preliminary hearing 
aa a matter of right. Specifically, If an Indictee is not accorded the right 
to demand a preliminary hearing he la denied due process at a critical 
stage of the proceedings. There ia alao a violation of equal protection 
when an Indictee is not accorded the rights granted to an individual pro-
secuted by information* However, since Utah law appeara to grant aa 
indictee, at his option* a preliminary examination, the constitutional Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may co tain errors.
•*»S'«* 
aett»mm*datto«^. between the essential secret nature of the grand jury 
proceedings, aad the right of oiie Indict**! to dstermtoe there was com* 
pllauce with the eYideutiary standards set forth iu 77*19<-3« 
la State *• Fanx:^ the issue before this court w&i th* appropriate 
time at which defease counsel should be .permitted to'exemlee the trees** 
cript for purposes of impeaehmeot of witnesses at th* trial* T h e erldeetlary 
standard of Seettoa ?7~l?-3 was neither put in issue eor discussed; however* 
the statement of Justice Crockett ie the majority opinion la applicable 
herein* 
*
 # # If anyone la under the illusion that in this country one 
may he coi^Jeitimed for alleged crime upon evidence taken 
in hts abseece aud kept secret from him, It i s hearteoiiig t# 
to he able to point out that such is ttet the stele' of our law* • . 
Without disclosure of th* testimony of the witnesses endorsed eat 
the ladi€tme^t# there is mo 0iher way for one indicted to determine 
whether there was adherence to the statutory evideutiary standard of 
?f^lf*3# prior to his plea* Bear to mind, any objection thereto 1* walked 
tiN*reaft^^ 
Plaintiff finally urges he should he permitted to take depositions, 
and that State *• Nlelsea should be overruled* With this contention, I 
am in complete agreement, A defead&ot la a crimlual actioa should he 
permitted to take depositions; however» he must proceed in compliance 
with the provisions of Sections 77-19*10 and 77-1 f - t l t U# C. A* 1*53, 
wherein a grand juror may not be examined except for the limited 
ii» i iiirtniw imiiNiiHiiiliii mini • • » — < • » « nannwnwiiMiiiwiinwnm-iwwiin nwnniwmiiiwiwlwwwiwiKKiwiii—iiiKu, imwiminwiMiimaui n i > i m i n m mi m mm mm .•mmim ir n M mi n iWiini i iimn 
% 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P. 2d 186 (1959). 
L0, At p. 355 ol 9 Utah 2d.' 
11, Utah, 522 P.2d 1366 <J9?4i. 
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As stated by Justice Henriod in his dls aent in State v« G«ert«: 
• .# mm- |Kr«ltmfnftry hearings and the right t® tafct depositions 
fref&eafly are the sharpest weapons available to co«o#^l In 
piercing subsequent testimony by coiifromtatioi* with prior 
inconsistent testimony* Such a* opportunity • • « may 
make the difference between guilt and innocence in the minds 
of the vmmbttm&mm* 
(AH emphasis supplied*) 
IIII»WII<IIMII>IIIIII w^l<>»l«i>iMiiiiiliiil<ll|liiiliWi»»ii'iiiiNilii ii «.iww»iiiini i n . *«**•**** mmm»>< <<><*****>» ium*u,mo<m, n>ii i .miniimuminiinw.n.ii.iinnww • —IHHIWII niiiwiiiiiuiii\m*\m,umm\\imim*nmmvmmmmmm 
12. II m*k 24 t 4 § , 353, 3S9 P . 2 3 12 <I 941). 
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